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NOTE
Baker v. Carr-Malapportionment in State
Governments Becomes A Federal Constitutional Issue*
Since its enigmatic 1946 Colegrove v. Green' decision, the Supreme
Court has not thought it necessary or wise to discuss extensively the
federal questions involved in the "political thicket" of state malapportion-
ment. Cases raising the issues in a variety of forms have been dismissed
with brief per curiam opinions, usually containing only citation to author-
ity.2 The 1960 census figures,3 however, have recently emphasized the in-
creasingly grotesque disparities in political strength between the citizens
of the cities and those of the rural areas. City voters, unable to force
the legislators to pass a reapportionment which would reflect this dynamic
shift in population, have continued to seek some formula by which the
allocation of state political power would be considered a federal con-
stitutional question. Arguments that due process requires that each vote be
counted equally in a democracy have made little headway. A more per-
suasive approach has been to attack an existing allocation indirectly by the
claim that it discriminates against some citizens irrationally in violation of
the equal protection clause. These efforts have won at least an opening
skirmish and perhaps the entire battle. Although no less than six opinions
and 158 pages were required to state the divergent views of the
Justices, the Supreme Court has held that a reapportionment case arising
from Tennessee presents a justiciable constitutional question to be heard
on its merits by the federal district court.
Newspaper and television commentators have hailed this decision, Baker
v. Carr,4 as a landmark case in the Court's history, certain to produce
fundamental changes at least equal to those that followed the decision in
*Prepared in connection with the Seminar in Legal Problems of Regional Economic
Development, Vanderbilt University School of Law, 1962.
1. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
2. Matthews v. Handley, 361 U.S. 127 (1959); Hartsfield v. Sloan, 357 U.S. 916
(1958); Radford v. Gary, 352 U.S. 991 (1957); Kidd v. McCanless, 352 U.S. 920
(1956); Anderson v. Jordan, 343 U.S. 912 (1952); Cox v. Peters, 342 U.S. 936 (1952);
Remmey v. Smith, 342 U.S. 916 (1952); Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors, 339 U.S.
940 (1950); South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950); MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S.
281 (1948); Colegrove v. Barrett, 330 U.S. 804 (1947); Cook v. Fortson, 329 U.S.
675 (1947).
3. 1 BuREAu OF THE CENsus, CENSUS OF POPULAMON: 1960, at 44-12, table 6
(1961).
4. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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Brown v. Board of Education.5 Such far reaching effects are potentially
present, for malapportionment, unlike legal segregation, is a national
rather than a regional problem, as involved in the politics of California or
Connecticut as in those of Georgia. Further, the scope of the effects may
well be broader, for apportionment goes to the very heart of any political
organization and determines which of the myriad elements and interests
in a society will have the controlling voice in deciding state objectives
and policies. The cities now complain that state governments are not
responsive to their needs, that problems such as public transportation,
traffic congestion, recreation, community planning, juvenile delinquency,
education and urban renewal receive unsympathetic consideration at the
state level.6 As these problems have become more pressing, a new city-
federal government rapport, of which President Kennedy's proposed De-
partment of Urban Affairs was an outgrowth, has appeared on the political
scene. If this new relationship continues to develop, the state governments
will be increasingly by-passed in the solving of contemporary problems.
An end to rural domination of the legislatures, however, could restore
normal city-state relationships and enhance the state governments as
political institutions. If, as some commentators seem to assume, the
Supreme Court means to impose population equality as the only acceptable
standard of apportionment, then radical changes in the functions and
relationships of state governments may well be on the way.7
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6. "Regardless of the fact that in the last two decades the United States has become
a predominantly urban country where well over two-thirds of the population now
lives in cities or suburbs, political representation in the majority of state legislatures is
50 or more years behind the times. Apportionments made when the greater part of
the population was located in rural communities are still determining and undermining
our elections.
"As a consequence, the municipality of 1960 is forced to function in a horse and
buggy environment where there is little political recognition of the heavy demands of
an urban population. These demands will become even greater by 1970 when some
150 million people will be living in urban areas.
"The National Institute of Municipal Law Officers has for many years recognized
the wide-spread complaint that by far the greatest preponderance of state representa-
tives and senators are from rural areas which, in the main, fail to become vitally
interested in the increasing difficulties now facing urban administrators,
"Since World War II, the explosion in city and suburban population has created
intense local problems in education, transportation, and housing. Adequate handling
of these problems has not been possible to a large extent, due chiefly to the political
weakness of municipalities. This situation is directly attributable to considerable under-
representation of cities in the legislatures of most states." Brief for the National
Institute of Municipal Law Officers as Amicus Curiae, pp. 2-3, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S,
186 (1962).
7. Two excellent studies of the legal and related problems of malapportionment are
Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 HAnv. L. tMv. 1057
(1958); Symposium, 17 LAw & CoNTEmp. PnoB. 253 (1952). Other useful works
often cited, some of which deal with special aspects of malapportionment, are
BA=E, RuRAL Vmasus URBAN PoLrncAL Pow~m (1955); GREENFIELD, FonD &
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The Court, however, has not determined in Baker v. Carr that represen-
tation must be in direct proportion to population to avoid violating the
fourteenth amendment. It has simply removed a widespread doubt that
questions of malapportionment could be considered by the federal courts.
What variations from a norm of equality between voters will eventually
be permissible can be established only by further litigation. Some con-
sideration of the factual background of the Tennessee apportionment situa-
tion and a review of the prior Supreme Court holdings in the tangled
area of "political questions" are necessary to analysis of this case. Against
this background, the opinions of most of the Justices show a continued
reluctance to wade very deep into the Maelstrom of malapportionment.
I. MALAPPOUONMENT IN T sNNESSEE
A. Historical Development
Controversy over the apportionment of the legislature is not a new
phenomenon in Tennessee politics. Three weeks of debate and horse trad-
ing were required before the Constitutional Convention of 1834 could
agree upon a compromise for the apportionment provisions of the con-
stitution.8 The character of the state was, of course, much different then
than it now is,9 but many of the same arguments currently used were
heard in the Convention debates.10 The populous and prosperous counties
of Middle Tennessee demanded that representation in both houses be
determined strictly by population. Any other system, they argued, was
EMERY, LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONM ENT: CALIFORNIA IN NATIONAL PERSPEcrvE
(1959); Aumann, Rural Ohio Hangs On, 46 NAT'L Mumc. REV. 189 (1957); Baker,
One Vote, One Value, 47 NAT'L MUNIC. REV. 16 (1958); Dauer & Kelsey, Unrep-
resentative States, 44 NAT'L MUNIC. REv. 571 (1955); Durfee, Apportionment of
Representation in the Legislature: A Study of State Constitutions, 43 MicH. L. REv. 1091
(1945); Walter, Reapportionment and Urban Representation, 195 ANNALS OF THE
AMERICAN AcAD. OF PoLrricAL AND SocI. Scr. 11 (1938).
8. Eight resolutions on apportionment were proposed on May 27, 1834, the first
day of Convention business, and not until June 14 was a compromise plan accepted
(the Convention did carry on other work during this period). There were still
disgruntled delegates to cast votes against the apportionment provisions when the
formal voting on the constitution was conducted. JouRNAL OF THE CONVENTION OF THE
STATE OF TENNESSEE CONVENED FOR THE PURPOSE OF REVISING AND A-MENDING THE
CONSTrrUTION THEREOF (1834).
9. Population in Tennessee had risen to 681,902; exports were estimated at a value
of $8,140,000 of which cotton accounted for $6,000,000; and although the state was
still predominately agricultural, there was a developing iron industry and good prospects
for exploiting the mineral resources of East Tennessee. Commerce had grown to the
point that taxes on merchants equaled the revenue produced by the land tax. Report
of the Select Committee, JOURNAL OF THE HOuSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1833, at 355-
60, quoted in 2 WITE, MESSAGES OF THE GOVERNORS OF TENNESSEE 1821-1835, at
444-47 (1952).
10. The debates on apportionment during the Convention appear in the issues of
the Nashville Republican and State Gazette or the Nashville Banner and Daily
Advertiser of the period June 4 to July 23, 1834.
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opposed to the basic concept of democracy and would impose taxation
without representation. East Tennessee, fast losing its relative equality in
numbers as settlers moved farther west, favored a single representative
for each county regardless of population. The analogy of the United
States Senate was invoked as a justification for giving the counties them-
selves political significance, while the avowed purpose of the plan was the
protection of the distinct minority interests of the region. The western
counties of the state were still relatively undeveloped but were rapidly
filling up. The vote of delegates from this region seemed to divide by
political expediency. Geographic representation would give the area an
immediate increase in legislative strength, but if migration westward
continued, a population basis would in the long run produce a greater
share of legislators." The solution eventually adopted for the Constitution
of 1835 made population the basic standard for apportionment but gave
some limited concessions to the concept of geographic representation.
Elections were to be "free and equal" and an enumeration of "qualified
voters" and a reapportionment was to be made every ten years. How to
determine who were "qualified voters" and how many there were in each
county did not seem to be a problem to the delegates. The number of
representatives was fixed at a maximum of ninety-nine and there could be
no more than thirty-three senators. Representatives were to be divided
among the counties according to the number of voters, but any county
having two-thirds of a ratio would receive a representative. Senators were
also to be apportioned by number of voters, but with the provision that
"the fraction that may be lost by any county or counties, in the apportion-
ment of the ... House ... shall be made up to such county or counties
in the Senate, as near as may be practicable."'2 Further limitations were
contained in the prohibition against dividing any county and the require-
ment that only contiguous counties be joined in making up floterial or
senatorial districts.
Although this plan produced some bitterly partisan political battles, the
Convention of 1870 adopted it for the constitution of that year, and it
has remained as the fundamental scheme of apportionment since then.13
It was applied in 1881, 1891, and with minor modifications, in 1901, the
Reapportionment Act 14 of that year being the one challenged in Baker v.
Carr.
11. For a good account of the conflicting economic interests and sectional bitterness
that existed between the cotton culture of the middle region, the small independent
farm semi-industrial society of the eastern region and the frontier settlements of the
west state, see ABEaNETny, FRom FRONTMR TO PLANTATION IN TENNEssEE: A STuDy
N FRoNTimR DmocaRAcy (1932).
12. TENN. CONST. OF 1835 art. II, §§ 5,6.
13. TENN. CONST. art. II, §§ 3-6.
14. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1901, ch. 122, now TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 3-101 to -109 (1956).
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B. The Current Situation
Since the reapportionment of 1901, the population pattern of the state
has undergone a radical change. Industrial development has simultaiheously
eliminated the need for much agricultural labor by mechanizing farming
and created a labor demand in the factories of the cities. In Tennessee,
this familiar process has worked out to produce four large metropolitan
areas, Memphis, Nashville, Knoxville, and Chattanooga. The four counties
containing these cities had 113,095 of a total voting population of 487,380
in 1900,15 or 23% of the voters. Taking the most favorable view of their
share of legislators by counting floterial representatives as though they
were elected solely by these four counties, the metropolitan counties had
22 of the 99 representatives (22%) and 8 of the 33 senators (24%) in 1901.
By 1950 the percentage in these four counties had risen to 40% of the total
voting population (796,805 of 1,978,548 total voters) while their legislative
representation remained unchanged. Regional distortions have also devel-
oped as the industrializing eastern counties have grown more rapidly in
population than the still agricultural western area. It is indeed difficult to
find any consistent pattern which the present apportionment and population
will fit. Two to one disparities in representation exists between counties
having a municipality of 10,000 and between counties not having a munici-
pality of 10,000 population.16 Viewed in terms of the whole state, 37% of
the voters elect 20 of the 33 senators while 40% of the voters elect 63 of the
99 representatives.17 However viewed, the present apportionment bears
little relationship to the method required by the Tennessee constitution. To
many minds, this change in relative representation constitutes an effective
disenfranchisement of city voters, a revolution produced by inactivity.
C. Exhaustion of State Remedies
Repeated efforts have been made to pass a reapportionment bill through
the General Assembly since 1911 when the 1901 act was supposed to be
replaced.'8 These bills have been defeated or at best referred to the
Legislative Council for further study.19 There is no provision in the
Tennessee constitution for popular initiative, and the method provided for
constitutional amendment is under legislative control.2 0 A convention
15. The following figures are drawn from 2 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF
POPuLATION: 1900, at 202-03, table 26 (1902) and 2 BtREAu OF Ta CENSUS, CENSUS
OF Portua Arox: 1950, at 42-92, table 42 (1952). The 1950 rather than the 1960
figures are used here since these are the ones used in the instant case.
16. See the opinion of Justice Clark, concurring, 369 U.S. at 254-58 for these and
other examples of disparities.
17. Brief for Appellants, p. 14, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
18. An excellent history of reapportionment in the state, prepared by the state
historian, Dr. Robert H. White, is contained in the TENNESSEE SENATE JOURNAL 1959,
at 909-60.
19. HJ. Res. 65, Tenn. Pub. Acts 1961, at 1114.
20. TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
1962]
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called to amend the constitution in 1953 was originally enpowered to
revise the apportionment provisions, but this power was deleted. 21
Stymied in the political arena, city voters brought suit in a state court
asking that elections under the 1901 act be enjoined. The chancellor
denied any affirmative relief. In a declaratory judgment, however, he held
the act unconstitutional but stated that the legislators could assemble as de
facto officers to pass a new reapportionment. When, in 1957, this case,
Kidd v. McCanless,22 reached the Supreme Court of Tennessee, the chan-
cellor was reversed. Rejecting the de facto doctrine as applicable, the
supreme court declared that "the ultimate result of holding this Act un-
constitutional by reason of the lapse of time would be to deprive us of the
present Legislature and the means of electing a new one and ultimately
bring about the destruction of the State itself."23 Appeal of this decision
to the Supreme Court of the United States was dismissed 24
D. The Case in the District Court
Suit in federal district court on a claimed deprivation of federal con-
stitutional rights seemed to be the only alternative still open. Although
the complaint in Baker v. Carr contains a count grounded on due process
-that there is an inherent right that all votes be counted equally and
that any system not following this standard violates fundamental fairness-
its chief theme is that the legislators from the underpopulated counties
have by inaction carried out a "purposeful and systematic plan to dis-
criminate against a geographical class of persons,"5 the city voters, and
thus to deny them equal protection of the laws.
Statistical data were gathered by the City of Nashville26 to add sub-
stance to both the due process and equal protection arguments. The study
is designed to show the discrimination in the burden of taxation and the
benefit of public expenditures allegedly resulting from malapportionment.
It compares the twenty-three counties which, according to the 1950 voting
population figures, are overrepresented under the state constitutional
formula and the ten counties which are underrepresented. Tax funds col-
lected for education 7 are distributed in such a way that the twenty-three
overrepresented counties receive an average of $152.25 per pupil while
the underrepresented counties receive $107.52. The average for all counties
is $129.90. In terms of total dollars, the overrepresented counties got
$2,069,643 or 17.2% more than they would have received under a formula
21. TENNssmE5. HousE JounNAL 1951, at 784.
22. 200 Tenn. 273, 292 S.W.2d 40 (1956).
23. Id. at 282, 292 S.W.2d at 44.
24. 352 U.S. 920 (1956).
25. Brief for Appellants, p. 6, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
26. Attached as exhibits to the Intervening Complaint of Ben West, Mayor, City of
Nashville, Tennessee, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
27. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1959, ch. 14.
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giving each pupil an equal amount. The underrepresented counties received
$7,126,829, or 20.8% less than a student equality formula would have given
them. As an extreme example, Moore County's share was $220.46 per
pupil while Shelby County's share was $95.85.
A more marked disproportion appears in the distribution of "County Aid
Funds,"23 representing two cents of the seven cent state gasoline tax
devoted to the maintenance of roads. Half of this fund is distributed
equally to the 95 counties; 25% goes to the counties on a basis of area; and
25% on a basis of population. Under this formula, the overrepresented
counties receive an average of $28.98 per registered motor vehicle, and
the underrepresented counties $6.10 per vehicle. The state average is
$15.84 per vehicle. Comparable figures for distribution per capita rather
than per vehicle are: overrepresented counties, $9.19; underrepresented
counties, $2.46; and state average, $5.82. Compared with Shelby County's
$4.55 per vehicle is Moore County's $68.13. Matching federal funds al-
located to the maintenance of state roads are also distributed by this same
formula.P
Initially, Judge William E. Miller of the middle district of Tennessee re-
fused to dismiss the complaint summarily, finding distinguishing features
in this case "that may ultimately prove to be significant."30 A three judge
district court, however, felt compelled to dismiss on the grounds "that
the federal courts, whether from a lack of jurisdiction or from the in-
appropriateness of the subject matter for judicial consideration, will not
intervene in cases of this type ..... ,1 In a dictum to the merits, the court
said, "With the plaintiffs' argument that the legislature of Tennessee is
guilty of a clear violation of the state constitution and of the rights of the
plaintiffs the Court entirely agrees. It also agrees that the evil is a serious
one which should be corrected without further delay."-2
II. MAIAPPowoNMNr IN TEM SUPREME COURT
A. The Colegrove Background
The case law which the district court found compelling begins with the
decision in Colegrove v. Green, a case in which citizens of Chicago chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the congressional districts of Illinois. Prior
to Colegrove, the apportionment of congressional districts had been an
issue before the Court but not in terms of the fourteenth amendment. In
Smiley v. Holm,3 a redistricting act which had failed to get the Governor's
28. TENN. CODE ANN. § 54-403 (1956).
29. TENN. CODE ANN. § 54-611 (Supp. 1961).
30. Baker v. Carr, 175 F. Supp. 649, 652 (M.D. Tenn. 1959).
31. Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. 824, 826 (M.D. Tenn. 1959).
32. Id. at 828.
33. 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
1962 ]
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approval as required by the state constitution was held to violate article 1,
section 4 of the federal constitution. And only statutory construction was
reached in another districting case, Wood v. Broom,34 although four justices
wanted to dismiss without a hearing on the merits on the ground of want
of equity.
Justice Frankfurter, writing for three of the seven justices who heard
Colegrove, found that the case could be decided on the statutory grounds
used in the Wood opinion or on the want of equity grounds mentioned in
that case. He went on, however, to enunciate the political question doc-
trine of reapportionment cases which has been a center of controversy
since. The thrust of Justice Frankfurter's opinion is that apportionment
problems, like those arising under the clause guaranteeing to the states a
republican form of government, are not properly justiciable under our
constitutional system. "[D]ue regard for the effective working of our
government revealed this issue to be of a peculiarly political nature and
therefore not meet for judicial determination."3 At least four distinct
considerations seemed involved in this conclusion.
(1) The provisions of the federal constitution clearly gave Congress
the right to control the election of its own members. For the Court
to interfere would be a usurpation of a power delegated to another
coequal branch of government in violation of the doctrine of separation
which runs throughout the Constitution.
(2) A court lacks the necessary standards by which to determine
the issues of apportionment. To reach a compromise between the
competing policies of equality of voting and the protection of minority
interests requires a weighing of an incredibly complex array of eco-
nomic, social, religious, ethnic and party factors, a process which the
narrowly constrained adversary system is inherently incapable of per-
forming.
(3) For the courts to attempt such policy judgments would weaken
rather than strengthen democracy. "It is hostile to a democratic system
to involve the judiciary in the politics of the people."z1 The remedy
must depend, "ultimately, on the vigilance of the people in exercising
their political rights."3 7
(4) The remedies which a court can employ are incapable of ef-
fecting a sure solution and might easily produce a worse situation than
the one complained of. For the court to make an empty pronounce-
ment of rights which it could not enforce would only weaken its power
to perform its proper functions.
34. 287 U.S. 1 (1932).
35. 328 U.S. at 552.
36. Id. at 553, 554.
37. Id. at 556.
[ VOL. 15
The dissenting opinion in Colegrove by Justices Black, Douglas and
Murphy found jurisdiction, justiciability, a federal right in need of pro-
tection, and no valid reason for declining to use an equitable remedy. The
decisive vote, however, was cast by Justice Rutledge who, while conceding
jurisdiction and justiciability in the sense that the federal issues involved
were amenable to the judicial process, nevertheless held that "the cause
is of so delicate a character, . . that the jurisdiction should be exercised
only in the most compelling circumstances."3 8 On the issues in Colegrove
then the Court divided four to three in favor of jurisdiction and justiciability
and four to three in favor of declining to exercise a discretionary, equitable
power.
The Colegrove holding was summarized in the cursory per curiam opinion
of South v. Peters: "Federal courts consistently refuse to exercise their
equity powers in cases posing political issues arising from a state's geo-
graphical distribution of electoral strength among its political subdivisions."39
And speaking precisely to the issue of geography as a criteria for reason-
able distribution of political strength, the Court said in MacDougall v.
Green:
It would be strange indeed, and doctrinaire, for this Court, applying such
broad constitutional concepts as due process and equal protection of the
laws, to deny a State the power to assure a proper diffusion of political
initiative as between its thinly populated counties and those having concen-
trated masses, in view of the fact that the latter have practical oppor-
tunities for exerting their political weight at the polls not available to the
former.40
The lower federal courts have interpreted these decisions to mean that
reapportionment problems, both of congressional districts and state legis-
latures, were not to be entertained, and the Supreme Court has regularly
sustained the dismissal with only a citation to authority.4 1
At least two of the district courts, however, have found enough dis-
cretion left to them by the Colegrove opinions to refuse to dismiss
reapportionment cases. In Magraw v. Donovan, 2 a Minnesota district court
retained jurisdiction of the case long enough to allow the legislature to act.
Its opinion strongly intimated that a failure by the legislature would pro-
duce a decree granting some form of affirmative relief. In a similar case
involving a territorial apportionment, Dyer v. Kazuhisa Abe, the court
38. Id. at 565.
39. 339 U.S. 276, 277 (1950).
40. 335 U.S. 281, 284 (1948).
41. See note 2 supra.
42. 159 F. Supp. 901 (D. Minn.) (motion to dismiss denied), jurisdiction retained
until legislature had an opportunity to act, 163 F. Supp. 184 (D. Minn. 1958),
case dismissed on plaintiffs' motion, 177 F. Supp. 803 (D. Minn. 1959), motion to
intervene denied, 288 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1961).
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stated that "any distinction between racial and geographic discrimination
is artificial and unrealistic... . The whole thrust of today's legal climate
is to end unconstitutional discrimination. It is ludicrous to preclude judicial
relief when a mainspring of representative government is impaired. Legis-
lators have no immunity from the Constitution."43
B. The Racial Discrimination Cases
The most serious challenge to the philosophy of Colegrove has arisen
from the increased scope and utilization of the equal protection clause
to end racial discrimination. To the proponents of a new federal approach
to reapportionment, an analogy to the racial voting and desegregation
cases proved irresistably appealing. In them they saw not only an intent
to give protection to a broader range of individual rights but also a
willingness by the Court to inject its prestige and authority into unusually
controversial social and political areas and to experiment -with remedial
devices less specific and final than the usual decree. The threads of racial
discrimination and political questions became intertwined in Gomillion v.
LightfootA when Alabama argued that Colegrove denied the Court's
right to inquire into the use made of a traditional "political" power-the
redistricting of a city-to exclude Negro voters. Seemingly reluctant to
answer the equal protection issue, the Court cast its opinion in terms of
denial of voting in violation of the fifteenth amendment. The otherwise
valid exercise of the state power to redistrict was considered as only a
colorable incident to this deprivation. The Court could not find, nor could
Alabama suggest, any basis other than racial discrimination to justify the
state action. Colegrove was further distinguished on the grounds, inter alia,
that there had been only a failure to act there while in Gomillion there was
positive action. For malapportionment cases, Gomillion, of course, can
easily be distinguished since its decision was based on the fifteenth amend-
ment, yet it is easy to read the case to mean that the setting of political
boundaries by a state is not so sacrosanct a political function that the Court
will be deterred by an equitable reticence from inquiring into legislative
discretion in every case. From this premise, it is not too great a jump to
think that the Court might inquire into the reasonableness of discrimination
between groups of voters based on standards other than race.
III. ThE OPINMONS
Against the background of Colegrove and its progeny, the opinions in
Baker v. Carr are as significant for what they leave unsaid as for their
actual pronouncements. Justice Stewart very precisely defines the extent
of the agreement among the majority justices.
43. 138 F. Supp. 220, 236 (1956), ret'd as moot, 256 F.2d 728 (1958).
44. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
[ VOL, 15
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The Court today decides three things and no more: "(a) that the court
possessed jurisdiction of the subject matter; (b) that a justiciable cause of
action is stated upon which appellants would be entitled to appropriate
relief; and (c) . . . that the appellants have standing to challenge the
Tennessee apportionment statutes."45
He would limit his commitment to these narrow points with the admonition
that "the burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of a statute rests on
him who assails it."46 Justice Clark, at the other extreme of the majority,
reached both merits and remedy. Accepting the uncontroverted popu-
lation and representation figures of the appellants and applying to them
both his own statistical analysis of relative representation and a method
used by Justice Harlan in his dissent, Justice Clark found "that the ap-
portionment picture in Tennessee is a topsy-turvical of gigantic proportions,
... a crazy quilt without rational basis."47 Such "invidious discrimination"
constitutes "a patent violation of the Equal Protection Clause . .. .
Significantly, it was the lack of rationality in the discrimination rather than
any discernible pattern of favoring rural over urban areas which made the
act unconstitutional to Justice Clark. In fact, he felt the MacDougall case,
which recognized the rationality of discriminating on a geographic basis,
was controlling, and he cited with apparent approval the Georgia county
unit system.4
Justice Douglas, by contrast, expressly rejected the Colegrove, Mac-
Dougall and South v. Peters opinions. His focus is on the nature of the
right to vote, a right which he found, if not clearly derived from the
federal constitution, is at least "inherent in the republican form of govern-
ment envisaged by Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution."49 The state
may not qualify this right by use of either race or sex as a standard. To
some extent, the equal protection clause places a third limitation on state
standards. The question in the case therefore, as Justice Douglas saw it,
was, "may a State weight the vote of one county or one district more
heavily than it weights the vote in another?" His answer is a definite "No,"
if the weighting produces an "invidious discrimination." How much a state
may vary from equal weighting before its action becomes "invidious," he
45. 369 U.S. at 265. Justice Stewart was here quoting from the holding in Justice
Brennan's opinion, 369 U.S. at 197-98.
46. Id. at 266.
47. Id. at 254. Justice Clark and Harlan differed on the weight to be assigned
each county sharing a floterial representative.
48. Id. at 253, 256 n.8.
49. Id. at 242. Justice Douglas would apparently be willing to consider cases in-
volving the right to vote even if brought under article IV, section 4 (the clause
guaranteeing to each state a republican form of government). While conceding that
some of the rights under this article are exclusively for the President or for Congress,
he would not abdicate all judicial power under the clause. To the extent that Luther




left unexplored. "[U]niversal equality is not the test; there is room for
weighting."5o
The opinion by Justice Brennan, in which the Chief Justice and Justice
Black joined, is an elaborate exposition of the points it seeks to cover, but
its silence on the other perplexing issues involved in malapportionment
causes one to sympathize with the words of Justice Frankfurter, that the
case stands as a "brooding omnipresence in the sky."5' Jurisdiction, justici-
ability, equitable abstinence, and standing had all been so interwoven in
Colegrove that Justice Brennan took pains carefully to distinguish each
issue. He reiterated the well established rule that the only limitations on
jurisdiction in the strict sense of power over the subject matter were
those in article III of the Constitution, that there be a "case or controversy,"
"arising under" the Constitution and made remediable by Congress. Find-
ing later in the opinion that the issues were justiciable, he established that
this was a "case or controversy," and since the complaint was based on the
fourteenth amendment and was not "so attenuated and unsubstantial as to
be absolutely devoid of merit," he thought it clearly was one "arising
under" the Constitution. The Civil Rights Act supplied any needed statu-
tory grant of power, and Justice Brennan found nothing in Colegrove
that foreclosed jurisdiction in this strict sense.
Standing-a sufficient personal interest in the suit-was also a simple
hurdle for Justice Brennan to cross, for even if the veiled words of the
plurality opinion in Colegrove were taken to mean that voters lacked
standing to correct a "wrong suffered ... as a polity," an actual majority
of the Justices who heard the case had expressly held that standing existed.
Justice Brennan's approach to the crucial issue of the justiciability of
malapportionment cases was somewhat oblique. Justice Frankfurter's
opinion in Colegrove had cast that case within the broad, loosely defined
area of judicial self restraint labelled as "political questions," an area in
which jurisdiction existed but in which the courts for a variety of reasons
have refused to exercise judicial power. Reviewing precedents involving
subjects as widely removed from malapportionment as determining the
end of hositilities or the status of an Indian tribe, Justice Brennan distilled
six elements which had been decisive in all these cases in the finding of a
nonjusticiable, "political question." These elements were:
[1] constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political depart-
ment; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the im-
possibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an
50. 369 U.S. at 244-45. Later in his opinion, Justice Douglas did suggest that the
goal to be sought was "substantial equality." 369 U.S. at 250 n.5.
51. Id. at 268.
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unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronounce-
ments by various departments on one question.
52
According to the Brennan analysis, the presence of one of these elements
in some cases, or a combination of them in others is what makes a non-
justiciable "political question" out of a case simply involving some political
power. "The nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function
of the separation of powers," 3 but more important for this case "it is the
relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the
Federal Government, and not the federal judiciary's relationship to the
States, which gives rise to the 'political question."5 4 Nor did Justice
Brennan think that the class of "political questions" most closely analogous
to the malapportionment cases-those arising under the clause guaranteeing
to each state a republican form of government-presented any exception
to the rule. "Guaranty Clause claims involve those [same] elements . . .
and for that reason and no other, they are nonjusticiable. In particular,
. . . the nonjusticiability of such claims has nothing to do with their
touching upon matters of state governmental organization."5 5 Measured
by these elements, malapportionment cases fell outside the pale of non-
justiciability.
We have no question decided, or to be decided by a political branch of
government coequal with this Court. Nor do we risk embarrassment of our
government abroad, or grave disturbance at home if we take issue with
Tennessee as to the constitutionality of her action here challenged. Nor need
appellants, in order to succeed in this action, ask the Court to enter upon
policy determination for which judicially manageable standards are lacking.
Judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and
familiar, and it had been open to courts since the enactment of the Four-
teenth Amendment to determine, if on the particular facts they must, that a
discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action.
5 6
Although the nonjusticiable "political question" of whether a particular
allocation of power within a state makes it a republican government under
the guaranty clause is necessarily similar to the problem of determining
whether an apportionment creates an invidious discrimination for purposes
of the equal protection clause, Justice Brennan felt the two issues could
be distinguished.
Viewed in the literal phrasing of their holdings, the majority opinions
52. Id. at 217.
53. Id. at 210.
54. Ibid.
55. Id. at 218.
56. Id. at 226. Justice Brennan here was apparently discussing the first, sixth, and
second of the elements of nonjusticiability which he had formulated. His third element
-the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for nonjudicial discretion-seems to be the element most nearly in point.
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state little new law not contained in Colegrove. Jurisdiction, justiciability,
and standing had all been reached and favorably decided there. But
introduced in the Brennan opinion is a purely national definition of the
"political question" doctrine which has important implications in a far
broader field than malapportionment. His list of elements making for
nonjusticiability contained no mention of a constitutional commitment of
issues to state rather than federal determination. While some federal
constitutional questions are so committed to Presidential or congressional
resolution that the Court will not adjudge rights dependent on these
questions, no such issues and no such rights are similarly so committed
to exclusive state delineation that federal courts must forego inquiry into
them.
As to other areas in which "political questions" are involved, Justice
Brennan expressly limited his synthesis of the doctrine and emphasized the
need for a case by case approach.57 It seems likely, however, that this
part of Baker v. Carr can not be ignored in any of the "political question"
cases.
Limiting the doctrine of "political questions" even in such sweeping
terms to the relationship of the branches of the federal government is
but little help in coming to grips with the other, even more difficult
problems of malapportionment. Although possible embarrassment of
federal-state relationships is seemingly eliminated as a factor in justicia-
bility, it may still remain an important guide for the exercise of equitable
discretion by federal courts. But what other considerations should be
important? Other than in peripheral issues such as failure to exhaust
state remedies or lack of time, discretion can be intelligently applied
only as guided by some policy. It seems obvious that the policy that has
for fifteen years approved the dismissal of reapportionment suits is now
changed; the boundaries of a new policy are yet to be worked out.
As Justices Clark and Harlan note,58 the majority seems to hold sub
silentio that unequal voting power in electing a state's legislature can
violate the equal protection clause and that, if the facts alleged are
established, the challenged Reapportionment Act of 1901 has done so in
Tennessee. Why it has is far from clear. The standard repeatedly men-
tioned is that of "invidious discrimination." Apparently the Court means
to require that at least some basis for the difference in treatment between
voters must be articulated or discernible in the apportionment scheme.
For this reason alone, the Tennessee apportionment which has grown up
haphazardly over sixty years would appear arbitrary and capricious. But
what other bases will be reasonable rather than arbitrary? Beyond the
minimum level of some articulated policy the caustic observations of
57. Id. at 210.
58. Id. at 261, 331.
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Justice Frankfnter graphically describe the difficult decisions which lie in
the future.
Considering the gross inequality among legislative electoral units within
almost every State, the Court naturally shrinks from asserting that in dis-
tricting at least substantial equality is a constitutional requirement en-
forceable by courts. Room continues to be allowed for weighting. This of
course implies that geography, economics, urban-rural conflict, and all the
other non-legal factors which have throughout our history entered into
political districting are to some extent not to be ruled out in the undefined
vista now opened up by review in the federal courts of state reapportion-
ments. To some extent-aye, there's the rub.59
If it is conceded that the state has picked a basis reasonable in kind,
what degree of discrimination will be allowable under it before becoming
invidious? Georgia's county unit system stands as a special challenge.
Not only does it limit the relative legislative strength of the most populous
county (Fulton, population 556,326) to no more than three times the
strength of the smallest county (Echols, population 1,876),60 it also applies
this three to one ratio to the election of the Governor and United States
Senators in party primaries. 6' Since only the Democratic primary has had
any significance in the state since the Civil War, it is possible to have a
Governor, and of course the legislature, elected by a distinct minority of
the voters. This is geographic diffusion of political strength run riot.
Certainly without overruling the MacDougall case and many of the state
constitutions, the Supreme Court cannot deny that the use of geographic
units is a reasonable basis for discriminating between voters for some
purposes. It would seem, however, that a geographic diffusion which
might be reasonable for choosing a legislature might be altogether ir-
rational for the election of a single officer, such as the governor, who
represents all of the people. But considering only the legislature, the
relative weight of a vote of a citizen of Atlanta is much less than that of
a citizen of any of the Tennessee cities. There is no question but that the
county unit system is a dearly enunciated and consistently followed legis-
lative policy decision in Georgia. Does the Court mean to require a
reapportionment in Tennessee because of the lack of any rationally stated
policy and to allow an even more disproportionate situation to continue in
Georgia? It seems unlikely, but the majority opinions, with the possible
exception of that of Justice Douglas, did not expressly foreclose this pos-
sibility.
Appropriately, a three judge federal court in Georgia62 has been among
59. Id. at 268-69.
60. 1 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1960, at 12-13, table 6
(1961).
61. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 34-3212 to -3218 (Supp. 1961).




the first to attempt to set standards under Baker v. Carr. Its action was
limited to issuing a temporary restraining order forbidding the use of the
county unit system in the Democratic primary, but its opinion has broader
application. Recognizing that, "unlike per se invidiousness, springing from
race, creed or color," the invidiousness of malapportionment is a matter
of degree, the court considered as relevant factors the rationality of the
state policy, the arbitrariness of the system, the genesis of the system, the
availability of political remedy, the delicate relationship between the
federal and state governments, and the place which the unit system has in
the historical development of our political institutions 3
The test is on the sum of these factors, and if the action-here the statute,
complained of-offends what are thought to be fundamental political concepts,
giving due regard to each factor and to the rights of plaintiff ... as com-
pared to the whole-the state, it must be stricken because of discrimination
so excessive as to be invidious.64
Although the court did not find the use of county units unconstitutional
as such, it did find that the newly revised Georgia system "misses the mark
in two respects: first in failing to accord the unit of plaintiff a reasonable
proportion of the whole, and second in failing to accord the units repre-
senting a majority of the population a reasonable proportion of the whole."05
Any system, according to the court, would be invidiously discriminatory,
if any unit has less than its share to the nearest whole number proportionate
to population, or to the whole of the vote in a recent party gubernatorial
primary, or to the whole vote for electors of the party in a recent presidential
election; provided that no discrimination is deemed to be invidious under
the system if the disparity against any county is not in excess of the disparity
that exists against any state in the most recent electoral college allocation,
or under the equal proportions formula for representation of the several
states in the Congress, and provided it is adjusted to accord with changes
in the basis at least once each ten years. 66
Has this opinion by the Atlanta federal court correctly caught the drift
of the Supreme Court's meaning? All of the factors it has used seem
validly relevant, and the standard of invidiousness which these factors
produced-state action is to be judged by "what are thought to be funda-
mental political concepts"-seems the inescapable criterion underlying the
majority opinions in Baker v. Carr. Although it is nowhere expressed,
the Supreme Court would apparently accept as one of these "fundamental
political concepts" the idea that a "majority of the population [should have]
a reasonable proportion of the whole [political strength]." There is less
63. Id. at 21-24.
64. Id. at 24. (Emphasis added.)
65. Ibid.
66. Id. at 25.
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grounds for confidence that the precise lower limits for apportionment
which the district court suggested will be upheld, especially if they were
to be applied to the election of a state legislature rather than to a party
primary. Even conceding that the apportionment of the electoral college
and of representation in Congress are rational systems, they are national
standards which might not be thought to allow enough flexibility in meeting
the political exigencies of any given state.
Another, closely related question, is the significance of a state con-
stitution in determining whether the kind or the degree of discrimination
is invidious. The Georgia county unit system for apportioning the legislature
is embedded in the constitution.67 In Tennessee, the present apportion-
ment is at odds with a constitutional plan which would use population as
the basis for both houses of the General Assembly. Suppose the Tennessee
legislature passed a reapportionment act somewhat similar to the county
unit system or which based one house on population and the other on
geographic units.68 Would the fact that such an apportionment patently
violated the Tennessee constitution have relevance or be determinative of
invidious discrimination for purposes of protecting federal rights. To hold
that it would implies that the state constitution is in this area at least a
higher law than that passed by the state legislature and possibly approved
by the state courts on the same subject. It could then at least be argued
that any claimed variation between a state constitution and a state statute,
e.g., a local taxing measure, would present a federal question under equal
protection of the laws. Such an absurd result could hardly be allowed.
The relevance of the Tennessee constitution on federal rights under the
fourteenth amendment was raised by appellants in the instant case but
dismissed in Justice Harlan's words as "manifestly untenable."69 All of
the Justices seemingly agreed on this point through Justices Clark and
Douglas would use the local constitution at least as a guideline in fashion-
ing an equitable remedy.
The lack of judicial standards by which to determine an "invidious
discrimination" is the central theme of the two dissenting opinions, Justice
Frankfurters being couched in terms of justiciability and Justice Harlan's
in terms of no recognizable federal right. To these Justices it seemed
impossible to say on the one hand that geographic diffusion of political
strength was a reasonable, acceptable basis for discriminating between
voters and on the other to hold that at some point this discrimination be-
67. GA. CONST. art. III, §§ 2, 3.
68. Governor Buford Ellington has proposed that the Tennessee General Assembly
reapportion the lower house according to population (using the constitutional formula)
but use geographic areas as the basis for apportioning the senate. This changed
system would then be ratified by a constitutional convention. Nashville Tennessean,
April 25, 1962, p. 1.
69. 369 U.S. at 332.
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came unconstitutional. For judges to pick this point in the name of
rationality would be in fact for them to make a choice "among competing
theories of political philosophy . *..."70 Justice Frankfurter's exhaustive
historical study convincingly proves that the courts can find no help in
past or current legislative practices. The choice among these theories, be-
ing determined not so much by any inherent worth they might contain as
by the pull and haul of competing factions, is so much a legislative function
that courts cannot and should not attempt to make it. To Justices Frank-
furter and Harlan the separation of powers philosophy is valid at all levels
of government; a legislative function is no less legislative for being at the
state level rather than at the national level, and a court has no more
business answering these kinds of questions for a state than it has answer-
ing them for the nation. To this criticism-truly the crux of the case-
the majority has apparently decided that at this time no more compre-
hensive response need be made than that "invidious discrimination" can
be judicially determined.
The final conundrum implicit in Baker v. Carr is the matter of remedy,
a subject Justice Brennan dismissed by "noting that we have no cause
at this stage to doubt the District Court will be able to fashion relief
'.71 Justices Clark and Douglas, however, considered remedies and
suggested that the "egregious injustices" might be removed by modifying
the existing apportionment to take seats away from the overrepresented
counties and award them to the underrepresented counties. Presumably,
over and under representation would be determined by the formula of the
Tennessee constitution, but if the state constitution is to be used as the
guideline for remedy, it seems difficult to avoid the suspicion that it is
also being used to determine the right. Further, this approach rests on
the assumption that the organic law of the 1870 constitution is the proper
choice between political philosophies for the 1960's and ignores the
contemporary choice made by the legislature and at least not overturned by
the Tennessee Supreme Court. In light of the broad range of discretion
which the Court apparently recognizes in legislative apportionment, it
would seem inconsistent rigidly to apply the terms of the 1870 constitution.
If forced to take affirmative action, however, a court may well use the state
constitution as a starting point simply for lack of a better one. In states
such as Georgia, where some of the apportionment inequities have been
written into the constitution, this approach to remedy would be useless.
An election at large is another, often suggested remedy which would at
least have the virtues of simplicity and of assuring an expression of the
will of the majority. But it goes too far and eliminates completely the
valid protection of minority rights which geographic diffusion provides. In
70. Id. at 300.
71. Id. at 198.
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an election at large, assuming that city voters could identify over a hundred
"city" candidates from several hundred names on the ballot, the metro-
politan areas would potentially control the entire legislature and not just
their numerical share. It is doubtful that these city legislators would wield
such complete power more fairly in dealing with rural problems than
the present legislators have done in handling urban legislation. This
remedy more than almost any other would open the courts to the Frank-
furter-Harlan criticism of judicial legislation, and finally, an election at
large would clearly violate the Tennessee constitution fully as much as the
present apportionment does.
The amicus brief of the Solicitor General suggested that the problems of
remedy, difficult as they are, will prove to be only academic. The possi-
bility of a court reapportionment is a great incentive for the elements
currently in control of the state legislatures to take action themselves to
salvage as much of their control as possible. Although criticized as a
"judicial bluff," this method of threatening action has recently been suc-
cessful in Minnesota, Hawaii, and New Jersey2 and would probably work
in the majority of malapportionment cases. The possibility of a recalcitrant
legislature, however, is always lurking in the background. The great virtue
of giving the legislature time to act under the spur of an impending
court decree, whatever qualms one may have about its propriety as a
normal juridical device, lies in the fact that it does return the problems
of malapportionment to the political arena where all the forces, rational
and irrational, of partisan politics can be exerted to hammer out a solution.
Such a solution might give the present rural legislators an unfair bargain-
ing advantage in forming a new, compromise apportionment, but it would
do less violence to traditional democratic processes than would a court
decree affirmatively dividing political strength.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
As valid as the arguments are in favor of protecting minority interests
by a geographical diffusion of political power, no one can seriously justify
the extent to which this protective device has been manipulated to give a
minority absolute control of the legislative processes of many states.
Freedom under the law may well mean a restricted freedom, but if a
majority of the individuals restricted have had no voice in determining
the content of the law, then this freedom is empty and illusory. The Court
has waited a long time since Colegrove before correcting this abuse, ap-
parently in the hope that the democratic process would work out its own
solution. The logic of the doctrine of separation of powers has its limits.
72. Magraw v. Donovan, supra note 42; Dyer v. Kazuhisa Abe, supra note 43; As-
bury Park Press, Inc. v. Woolley, 33 N.J. 1, 161 A.2d 705 (1960).
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Certainly each branch of government must give to the others a very wide
discretion in determining what limitations the constitution places upon
the functions which are the peculiar province of each branch. Discretion,
however, is not absolute; every action by executive, legislature, and court
must have its justification within the constitution to be valid. When
constitutional limitations have obviously been ignored by the legislature
and its range of discretion has been exhausted, the courts must declare the
legislative action unconstitutional regardless of the doctrine of separation.
In no other way can a court remain true to its own oath to maintain the
constitution.
The Court's decision in Baker v. Carr was properly cast in terms of
protecting individual rights under the equal protection clause, for this
issue can be distinguished and separately handled. It does seem inevitable,
however, that the decisions which set standards by which to determine
invidious discrimination will also by these standards delineate, at least in
broad outline, one aspect of what will be considered an acceptable "re-
publican" form of government guaranteed by the Constitution.
The Court has done no more than jog the frame of government back
toward an alignment more consonant with democratic ideals. By its
silence as to how much inequality will constitute an invidious discrimina-
tion, it has openly invited the legislatures to correct their own defects and
become more representative bodies. The range of acceptable compromises
seems purposefully broad and vague. If forced to predict what the mini-
mum standard may eventually prove to be, one guess might be that a
majority of the people must be in control of at least one house or that a
choice be clearly made by a majority to abdicate such control. To the
extent that these goals are achieved by the legislatures, the doctrine of
separation is observed; to the extent that changes are the result of judicial
mandate, any violation of this doctrine is compensated for by the re-opening
of the channels of normal democratic processes and a renewed vitality of
the state governments. Although it may prove difficult to fit the cases
which must implement Baker v. Carr into established notions of separation
of powers, the results are worth the price. One can easily agree with Justice
Clark that "in my view the ultimate decision today is in the greatest
tradition of this Court."73
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